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Abstract—A large fraction of total electricity demand is
comprised of end-use devices whose demand for energy is
inherently deferrable in time. Of interest is the potential to use
this latent flexibility in demand to absorb variability in power
supplied from intermittent renewable generation. A fundamental
challenge lies in the design of incentives that induce the desired
response in demand. With an eye to electric vehicle charging,
we propose a novel forward market for deadline-differentiated
electric power service, where consumers consent to deferred
service of pre-specified loads in exchange for a reduced price
for energy. The longer a consumer is willing to defer, the lower
the price for energy. The proposed forward contract provides a
guarantee on the aggregate quantity of energy to be delivered
by a consumer-specified deadline. Under the earliest-deadline-
first (EDF) scheduling policy, which is shown to be optimal
for the supplier, we explicitly characterize a non-discriminatory,
deadline-differentiated pricing scheme that yields an efficient
competitive equilibrium between the supplier and consumers. We
further show that this efficient pricing scheme, in combination
with EDF scheduling, is incentive compatible (IC) in that every
consumer would like to reveal her true deadline to the supplier,
regardless of the actions taken by other consumers.
Index Terms—Demand response, electricity markets, renew-
able energy, game theory, mechanism design.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the electric power industry transitions to a greater reliance
on intermittent and distributed energy resources, there emerges
a need for flexible resources that can respond dynamically to
weather impacts on wind and solar photovoltaic output. These
renewable generation sources have limited controllability and
production patterns that are intermittent and uncertain. Such
variability represents one of the most important obstacles to
the deep integration of renewable generation into the electricity
grid. The current approach to renewable energy integration
is to balance variability with dispatchable generation. This
works at today’s modest penetration levels, but it cannot
scale, because of the projected increase in reserve generation
required to balance the variability in renewable supply [7]. If
these increases are met with combustion fired generation, they
will both be counterproductive to carbon emissions reductions
and economically untenable.
This work was supported in part by NSF ECCS-1351621, NSF CNS-
1239178, NSF IIP-1632124, PSERC under sub-award S-52, US DoE under
the CERTS initiative, and the MIT-SUTD International Design Center (IDC)
Grant IDG21400103. Both authors contributed equally to the submitted work.
† E. Bitar is with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
and the School of Operations Research and Information Engineering, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY, 14853, USA. Email: eyb5@cornell.edu
††Y. Xu is with the Engineering Systems and Design Pillar,
Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore. Email:
yunjian_xu@sutd.edu.sg
As wind and solar energy penetration increases, how must
the assimilation of this variable power evolve, so as to
minimize these integration costs, while maximizing the net
environmental benefit? Clearly, strategies which attenuate the
increase in conventional reserve requirements will be an essen-
tial means to this end. One option is to harness the flexibility in
demand-side resources. As such, significant benefits have been
identified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [11]
in unlocking the value of coordinating demand-side resources
to address the growing need for firm, responsive resources to
provide balancing services for the bulk power system.
A. The Current Approach to Demand Response
There is an opportunity to transform the current operational
paradigm, in which supply is tailored to follow demand, to
one in which demand is capable of reacting to variability
in supply – an approach which is generally referred to as
demand response (DR) [1]. The primary challenge is the
reliable extraction of the desired response from participating
demand resources on time scales aligned with traditional bulk
power balancing services.
The majority of DR programs in place today are limited
to peak shaving and contingency-based applications. The
two most common paradigms for customer recruitment and
control are: (1) direct load control where a load aggregator
or utility procures the capability of direct load adjustment
through a forward market or transaction (e.g. call options
for interruptible load) [8], [20], [25], [37] and (2) indirect
load control where consumers or devices adjust their energy
consumption in response to dynamic price signals [12], [14],
[17], [18]. While dynamic pricing has the potential to improve
the economic efficiency of electricity markets [5], [33], [15],
it subjects consumers to the risk of paying high peak prices,
and can have the counterproductive effect of increasing the
variability in demand [19], [29]. And, of particular relevance
to this paper’s emphasis on electric vehicle (EV) charging is
a recent empirical study [31] that indicates dynamic pricing
may perform worse than a flat-rate tariff for EV charging in
terms of generation costs and emissions impacts. In short,
demand response implemented through dynamic pricing may
not provide the level of assurance required to avoid the use of
conventional generation to manage the electric power system.
B. A Deadline Differentiated Energy Service Approach
In the following paper, we propose a novel market frame-
work to enable the direct control of deferrable loads, with a
particular emphasis on electric vehicle (EV) charging. Broadly,
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2the proposed market centers on the provisioning of deadline
differentiated energy services to customers possessing the
inherent ability to delay their consumption (up to a point)
in time. From the consumer’s perspective, the longer she is
willing to delay the receipt of a specified quantity of energy,
the less that customer pays (per-unit) for said energy. The
supplier, on the other hand, implicitly purchases the right
to manage the real-time delivery of power to participating
consumers by offering a discount on energy with longer
deadlines on delivery. And, the longer the consumer-specified
deadlines, the more flexibility the supplier has in meeting the
corresponding energy requirements. Put simply, the supplier
can extract flexibility from the demand-side through direct
load control, all while providing firm guarantees on delivery
by consumer-specified deadlines. In this way, the supplier can
align its operational requirements with the vast heterogeneity
in end-use customer needs.
The general concept of electric power service differentiation
is not new [25], [24]. Many have studied the problem of
centralized control of a collection of loads for load-following
or regulation services – all while ensuring the satisfaction of a
pre-specified quality-of-service (QoS) to individual resources
[6], [13], [9], [21], [22], [26], [28], [36], [39]. There has, how-
ever, been little work in the way of designing market mecha-
nisms that endogenously price the flexibility being offered by
the demand side, while incentivizing consumers to truthfully
reveal their preferences to the operator – for example, the
ability to delay energy consumption in time. Along these lines,
the authors in [20] propose a forward market for duration-
differentiated energy services. Several classic [8], [37] and
more recent [2] papers have explored the concept of reliability-
differentiated pricing of interruptible electric power service,
where consumers take on the risk of supply interruption in
exchange for a reduction in the nominal energy price. Beyond
the difficulty in auditing such markets and the apparent issues
of moral hazard, the primary drawback of such approaches
stems from the explicit transferal of quantity or price risk to
the demand side. This amounts to requiring that consumers
plan their consumption in the face of uncertain supply or prices
– a nontrivial decision task.
With the aim of alleviating the aforementioned challenges,
we propose and analyze a novel forward market for deadline
differentiated energy services,1 where consumers consent to
deferred supply of energy in exchange for a reduced per-
unit energy price. Such a market would naturally complement
the proliferation of plug-in electric vehicles (EV) in the US
transportation fleet.
Example 1 (Electric Vehicle Charging). With this motivation
in mind, we now illustrate several basic questions that might
arise in the design and operation of markets for deadline dif-
ferentiated energy services. To frame the discussion, consider
a scenario involving the operation of a parking infrastructure
equipped with an array of EV charging stations and local
1The concept of deadline differentiated pricing was first proposed in a
conference paper [3] and subsequently empirically evaluated in [30].
photovoltaic (PV) generation.2 The EVs being charged in such
facilities are naturally modeled as having the ability to delay
their receipt of energy in time. Accordingly, upon connecting
an EV to a charging station, the vehicle’s owner is presented
with a menu of prices – each of which stipulates a per-
unit price for energy and a corresponding delivery deadline.
Faced with such choices, how does the EV owner decide upon
which bundle of energy-deadline pairs to purchase given the
inherent ability to delay consumption? On the supply side, the
operator of the parking infrastructure is required to meet all
energy requests by their corresponding deadlines. How should
the operator set the menu of deadline differentiated prices to
induce the desired demand from a population of EV owners?
What if the available energy supply is random, as is the case
with PV generation? In order to address such questions, we
first require a description of the underlying market, which we
informally describe below to orient the reader. 
Market Operation. The forward market for deadline dif-
ferentiated energy service operates according to a three-step
process. In step 1, the supplier announces a mechanism. In
step 2, the consumers simultaneously report their demand.
In step 3, the mechanism is executed; namely, prices are
set and the requested demand is delivered to each consumer.
Time is assumed to be discrete with periods indexed by
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N .
Step 1 (Mechanism Design). At the beginning of period
k = 0, the supplier announces a market mechanism (pi,κ)
consisting of both a scheduling policy pi (cf. its formal defi-
nition in Section III), and pricing scheme κ = (κ1, . . . , κN )
that maps the aggregate demand bundle x (cf. its definition
in Step 2) into a menu of deadline-differentiated prices,
pk = κk(x), k = 1, . . . , N. (1)
The price menu stipulates a per-unit price pk ($/kWh) for
energy guaranteed delivery by period k. At the heart of the
mechanism design is the restriction that prices are nonincreas-
ing in the deadline. Namely, the longer a customer is willing
to defer her consumption, the less she is required to pay. We
will use P = {p ∈ RN+ | p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN} to denote the
set of feasible deadline-differentiated price bundles.
Step 2 (Consumer Reporting). Each consumer then reports
a bundle of deadline-differentiated energy quantities a =
(a1, . . . , aN )
> ∈ RN+ . Here, the quantity ak (kWh) denotes
the amount of energy guaranteed delivery by the deadline k.
It follows that said consumer will receive at least
∑k
t=1 at
amount of energy by deadline k. The aggregate demand bundle
is the sum of all individual consumer bundles, which we
denote by x = (x1, . . . , xN )> ∈ RN+ .
Step 3 (Pricing and Energy Delivery). Given an aggregate
demand bundle x, the deadline differentiated prices are set
according to p = κ(x). Pricing is non-discriminatory, in that
2Of particular relevance to our development is the growing multitude of
companies offering turn-key products that integrate EV charging infrastructure
with solar photovoltaic canopies [10], [32].
3all customers are charged according to the same menu of
prices. Thus, a customer requesting a bundle a pays p>a.
The supplier must also deliver the aggregate demand bundle
x according to the previously announced scheduling policy
pi. Essentially, a scheduling policy is said to be feasible if
it delivers each consumer’s requested energy bundle by its
corresponding deadline. The supplier is assumed to have two
sources of electricity from which she can service demand:
intermittent and firm.
• Intermittent supply: an intermittent supply modeled as a
discrete time random process s = (s0, s1, . . . , sN−1)
with known joint probability distribution. Here, sk ∈ S
(kWh) denotes the energy produced during period k and
S ⊂ R+ the feasible supply interval. The intermittent
supply is assumed to have zero marginal cost.
• Firm supply: a firm supply with a fixed price of c0 > 0.
The price c0 can be interpreted as the nominal flat rate
for electricity set by the local utility.
While stylized in nature, our models of supply and demand
are meant to reflect the essential features of an emerging grid
infrastructure that enables the direct coupling of deferrable
electric loads with variable renewable supply.
C. Summary of Main Results
The primary contribution of our paper is the design of a
market mechanism for deadline differentiated energy services,
which implements truth-telling at a dominant strategy equilib-
rium across the population of consumers, while maximizing
social welfare at a competitive equilibrium between a price-
taking supplier3 and a continuum of infinitesimally small
consumers. We provide here a roadmap of the paper together
with a summary of our main results.
• We provide a stylized, yet descriptive, model of both de-
ferrable electricity demand and a supplier with both firm
and intermittent supply in Sections II and III, respectively.
• We formulate the supplier’s scheduling problem as
a constrained stochastic optimal control problem and
prove average-cost optimality of the earliest-deadline-
first (EDF) scheduling policy. As a corollary, this result
enables the explicit characterization of the supplier’s
marginal cost curve in Theorem 2.
• It is reasonable to expect that the supplier cannot observe
the true deadline of each individual consumer. The pres-
ence of asymmetric information may lead to significant
welfare loss, if consumers misreport their true deadlines.
Somewhat surprisingly, we show under mild assumptions
on consumers’ utility functions that a mechanism consist-
ing of an EDF scheduling policy, together with a uniform
marginal cost pricing scheme implements consumers’
truth-telling behavior in dominant strategies.
• We show in Section IV-B that marginal cost pricing, in
combination with EDF scheduling, induces an efficient
3A price-taking supplier cannot control market prices, because of govern-
ment regulation or perfect competition. Instead, it seeks to maximize its profit
by scheduling the purchase of its firm supply.
competitive equilibrium that simultaneously maximizes
the (price-taking) supplier’s profit and the social welfare.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [4], where
we proved the existence of a truth-telling Nash equilibrium.
In the present paper, we establish a stronger incentive com-
patibility result. Namely, it is a dominant strategy for each
consumer to be truth-telling, regardless of the actions taken
by other consumers. All formal proofs of our stated results
can be found in the Appendix of this paper.
D. Related Work
There have recently emerged several papers concerned
with the design of incentives for deferrable electric loads.
The authors of [16] propose an idea similar to this paper,
where consumers are offered a discounted electricity price in
exchange for the delay of their energy consumption. How-
ever, the focus of [16] is not on pricing, but rather on the
problem of optimal scheduling faced by the operator, who
is assumed to have full information about consumers – for
example, knowledge of their true deadlines. Closer to the
present paper, [27] proposes a greedy online mechanism for
electric vehicle charging, which is shown to be incentive
compatible and achieve a bounded (worst-case) competitive
ratio. These theoretical results require, however, a VCG-type
(discriminatory-price) payment scheme, as opposed to the
uniform-price scheme proposed in this paper. More strongly,
they impose an additional assumption that consumers cannot
report false deadlines exceeding their true underlying dead-
lines. Such assumption substantially simplifies the problem
of designing an incentive compatible pricing scheme when
consumers are permitted to report arbitrary deadlines – the
setting considered in the present paper.
II. MODEL OF DEMAND
We consider a model involving a continuum of infinitesimal
consumers, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Since each individual
consumer’s action has no influence on the price, she will act as
a price taker. Such an assumption is reasonable and commonly
employed in the context of retail electricity markets [8], [23],
[35], [37], where it is not uncommon for an electric power
utility to service 104 to 106 customers – a setting in which
each consumer herself is too small to influence the price.
We propose a consumer utility model yielding a preference
ordering on deadlines, where the longer the delay in con-
sumption, the smaller the utility derived from consumption.
In particular, we assume that each consumer has a single
deadline preference. More precisely, a consumer with deadline
preference k incurs no loss of utility by deferring consumption
until deadline k and derives zero utility for any consumption
thereafter. This assumption is reasonable for electric loads such
as plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), dish washers, and laundry
machines, as customers commonly require only that such loads
fully execute before a specific time. Such intuition lends itself
to the following definition of consumer type.
Definition 1 (Consumer type). The type of consumer i is
defined as a triple
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Fig. 1. Four examples of utility functions satisfying Assumption 1.
θi = (ki, Ri, qi),
which consists of her deadline ki ∈ N, marginal utility Ri ∈
R+, and maximum demand qi ∈ R+.
Consumer i’s utility function depends only on her type θi and
is assumed to satisfy the following conditions.
Assumption 1. A consumer of type θi derives a utility that
depends only on the total energy consumed by her true
deadline ki. The utility function Uθi : R+ → R+ is assumed
to be non-negative and non-decreasing over [0, qi] with
Uθi(y) ≤ yRi, for all y ∈ [0, qi],
where Ri = Uθi(qi)/qi. We also assume that Uθi(y) = Uθi(qi)
for all y ≥ qi. 
Note that the marginal utility Ri associated with a consumer
type θi is defined as the ratio of the maximum utility Uθi(qi)
to the maximum demand qi. It is also worth mentioning
that Assumption 1 prevents the treatment of general concave
utility functions, as incentive compatibility may fail to hold
for certain concave utility functions. We refer the reader to
Remark 3 for a more detailed discussion.
Example 2 (Consumer utility functions). It is worth empha-
sizing that Assumption 1 accommodates a large family of
utility functions. Indeed, every utility function that lies below
the piecewise affine function Uθi(y) = Ri min{y, qi} satisfies
Assumption 1. Figure 1 depicts several such utility functions.
The utility function depicted in Figure 1(b) characterizes
electric loads with ‘all or nothing’ utility characteristics. For
example, in the context of electric vehicle charging, qi > 0
can be interpreted as the minimum amount of battery charge
required by the consumer in order to fulfill her next trip.
Naturally, the consumer obtains zero utility if the battery level
is below this threshold. Many job-oriented appliances, such
as dishwashers, are similarly modeled. The utility function in
Figure 1(c) is a natural generalization of that in 1(b), and could
capture the utility function of a consumer having multiple
all-or-nothing jobs requiring completion before a common
deadline. Finally, the utility function in Figure 1(d) is a general
nonlinear utility function that satisfies Assumption 1. 
We let Θ denote the set of all possible consumer types,
which is assumed to be finite. Let ρ : Θ → [0, 1] denote
the distribution of consumer types over the space Θ. In other
words, for every θ ∈ Θ, there is a ρ(θ) fraction of consumers
of type θ. It follows that
∑
θ∈Θ ρ(θ) = 1.
Definition 2 (Consumer action). The action of a consumer
is a vector a = (a1, . . . , aN )> ∈ RN+ , where ak denotes the
amount of energy that is guaranteed delivery by deadline k.
The maximum amount of energy any consumer can request is
Q = max(k,R,q)∈Θ{q}. Hence, each consumer’s action space
is restricted to A = {a ∈ RN+ | ∑k ak ≤ Q}.
It follows from the above definition that q ≤ Q for every
type θ = (k,R, q). In other words, it is feasible for every
consumer to request her maximum demand q. Given a fixed
scheduling policy and pricing scheme, a consumer’s strategy
ϕ : Θ → A maps her type into an action. In the following
analysis, we will be concerned with identifying conditions on
both the scheduling policy and pricing scheme that lead to
efficient allocations, while inducing consumers to truthfully
reveal their underlying deadline preferences. A consumer of
type θ = (k,R, q) is defined to be truth-telling if she requests
q units of energy at her true deadline k, and nothing else. We
make this notion precise in the following definition.
Definition 3 (Truth-telling). A consumer of type θ = (k,R, q)
is defined to be truth-telling if her strategy a∗ = ϕ∗(θ) satisfies
a∗j = 0 for all j 6= k and a∗k = q.
Indeed, Definition 3 is equivalent to the standard definition
of truth-telling in which a consumer is required to report her
exact type. In Corollary 1, we show that social welfare is
maximized at a competitive equilibrium, even if the supplier
does not have knowledge of the consumers’ utility functions
(including the parameter R), as long as R is no less than
the marginal cost of firm supply c0 (cf. Assumption 3).
In other words, a consumer of type θ = (k,R,Q) only
needs to report her true deadline k and maximum demand
q to the supplier, and the profit maximization problem of a
(price-taking) supplier naturally yields social optimality. In
Definition 3, we require that the consumer requests the entirety
of her demand q to be delivered by her true deadline k.
This is without loss of generality, because the consumer’s
utility depends only on the total energy consumed by her true
deadline k (cf. Assumption 1).
It is worth mentioning that under an arbitrary scheduling
policy and pricing scheme, it is indeed possible that a con-
sumer’s best response is untruthful (cf. Remark 2 and the
discussion following Definition 6). Our aim is to provide an
explicit characterization of a scheduling policy and pricing
scheme that implement truth-telling as a dominant strategy
for every consumer i.
Given the collection of consumer types θ = {θi}i∈[0,1]
5and a strategy profile ϕ = {ϕi}i∈[0,1], the aggregate demand
bundle x is given by the mapping
x = d(θ,ϕ) =
∫
i∈[0,1]
ϕi(θi)η(di), (2)
where η is the Lebesgue measure defined over [0, 1], and
d = (d1, . . . , dN ) maps (θ,ϕ) into an N -dimensional non-
negative vector.4 Under the truth-telling strategy profile ϕ∗ =
{ϕ∗i }i∈[0,1] specified in Definition 3, the aggregate demand
bundle simplifies to
x∗j = dj(θ,ϕ
∗) =
∑
θ∈Θ
q · ρ(θ) · 1{j=k} (3)
for all j = 1, . . . , N , where θ = (k,R, q). Here, 1{·} denotes
the indicator function for the event in the subscript.
A. Consumer Surplus
We are now in a position to characterize the expected
surplus derived by a consumer. It depends on: (i) her own type
and strategy, (ii) the remaining consumers’ types and strategy
profile, (iii) the pricing scheme, and of course, (iv) the schedul-
ing policy employed by the supplier. Before proceeding, we
require the definition of pertinent notation. We define the
random variable ωpik,i(x,a) to denote the amount of energy
delivered to consumer i by stage k given her requested bundle
a and aggregate demand bundle x. This random variable,
which naturally depends on the scheduling policy pi employed
by the supplier, is formally defined in Appendix A.5
We require that the requested quantities are always supplied
by their corresponding deadlines and the total quantity deliv-
ered to a consumer never exceeds said consumer’s total de-
mand. More formally, we require for each consumer i ∈ [0, 1]
taking action a ∈ A that∑k
t=1
at ≤ ωpik,i(x,a) ≤
∑N
t=1
at (4)
with probability one, for all aggregate demand bundles x and
k = 1, . . . , N .
In order to formally define and analyze incentive com-
patibility of our proposed market mechanism, we require a
definition of the expected surplus derived by a consumer under
a particular strategy. Given a scheduling policy pi and a pricing
scheme κ (that maps every aggregate demand bundle x into
a menu of deadline differentiated prices p) employed by the
supplier, and all consumer types θ = {θi}i∈[0,1], consumer i
receives an expected surplus (payoff) under a strategy profile
ϕ = {ϕi}i∈[0,1] that is given by
vpii (θ,ϕ,κ) = E
{
Uθi
(
ωpiki,i(x,a)
)}
− κ(x)>a. (5)
Here, ki is consumer i’s true deadline, x = d(θ,ϕ) is the
aggregate demand bundle, a = ϕi(θi) is the action taken by
4Note that we have implicitly assumed that for every θ, the function
ϕ = {ϕi(θi)}i∈[0,1] is Lebesgue integrable in i. This assumption holds, for
example, under a symmetric strategy profile according to which all consumers
of the same type take the same action.
5Note that we have allowed the supply ωpik,i(x,a) to depend explicitly on
the consumer index i, as the supplier may employ a scheduling policy that
depends on the consumer index.
consumer i, and κ(x) is the price bundle set according to the
pricing scheme κ at the aggregate demand x. Expectation is
taken with respect to the random variable ωpiki,i(x,a).
Clearly, a scheduling policy pi together with a pricing
scheme κ defines a game for the consumer population, with
each individual consumer’s payoff expressed in (5). We note
that this is an aggregative game, where the payoff function
of each player depends on the population’s strategy profile
only through the sum of their actions – the aggregate demand
bundle x = d(θ,ϕ). We can therefore rewrite consumer i’s
payoff in (5) in a form that depends on other players’ strategies
only through their sum x. Namely,
V pii (θi, ϕi,x,κ) = E
{
Uθi
(
ωpiki,i(x,a)
)}
− κ(x)>a, (6)
where a = ϕi(θi). Moreover, it follows from the service
constraint in (4) that under the truth-telling strategy ϕ∗i , the
payoff derived by consumer i simplifies to the deterministic
quantity
V pii (θi, ϕ
∗
i ,x,κ) = Uθi(qi) − κki(x)qi, (7)
where θi = (ki, Ri, qi). It is important to note that the
expression in (7) does not depend on the types and strategies
of the other consumers, or the scheduling policy used by the
supplier, as long as the service constraint in (4) is respected.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be a plausible solution
concept to explore for this game, as it requires each individ-
ual consumer to have information regarding the distribution
of other consumers’ types, as well as knowledge of the
probability distribution of ωpiki,i(x,a), which in turn depends
on the distribution of the intermittent supply process s. We
circumvent such informational assumptions by focusing our
analysis around a stronger solution concept – namely, the
dominant strategy equilibrium of the game. A strategy ϕi is a
dominant strategy for consumer i of type θi, if it maximizes
her expected payoff regardless of the actions taken by the other
consumers. We have the following definition.
Definition 4 (Dominant strategy). A strategy ϕi is a dominant
strategy for a consumer i of type θi if
V pii (θi, ϕi,x,κ) ≥ V pii (θi, ϕ′i,x,κ), ∀ ϕ′i, ∀ x ∈ RN+ .
We note that in Definition 4, a change of an individual
consumer i’s strategy has no influence on the aggregate
demand bundle x, because each consumer is assumed to be
infinitesimal in size, and the aggregate demand bundle is given
by Eq. (2). In Definition 6, we define a mechanism to be
incentive compatible if it implements truth-telling in dominant
strategies. Surprisingly, we show in Section IV that a mecha-
nism consisting of an earliest-deadline-first (EDF) scheduling
policy in combination with a marginal cost pricing scheme
is incentive compatible and induces an efficient competitive
equilibrium between the supplier and consumers.
III. MODEL OF SUPPLY
As one of the primary thrusts of this paper is the character-
ization of a competitive equilibrium between the supplier and
consumers and its efficiency properties, we now consider the
6behavior of a price-taking supplier, whose aim is to maximize
his expected profit given a predetermined price bundle. The
expected profit derived by a supplier equals the revenue
derived from the sale of a bundle of deadline differentiated
energy quantities less the expected cost of firm supply required
to service said bundle. In determining his supply curve under
price taking behavior, the supplier’s objectives are two-fold:
• Scheduling. Determine an optimal scheduling policy to
causally allocate the intermittent supply across the dead-
line differentiated consumer classes, in order to minimize
the expected cost of firm supply required to ensure that
demand bundles are served by their respective deadlines.
• Pricing. Given the optimal scheduling policy, determine
a marginal cost supply curve that specifies the bundle of
energy he is willing to supply at every price bundle.
Essentially, the specification of the supplier’s marginal cost
curve requires the explicit characterization of the gradient of
the supplier’s minimum expected cost of firm supply. This, in
turn, requires the specification of supplier’s optimal scheduling
policy, which is proven to have an earliest-deadline-first (EDF)
structure in Theorem 1. With the optimal scheduling policy in
hand, we derive a closed-form expression for the supplier’s
marginal cost curve in Theorem 2.
A. Feasible Scheduling Policies
We now offer a precise formulation of the supplier’s class
of feasible scheduling policies given an aggregate demand.
When considering the problem of scheduling, it is important
to distinguish between intra-class and inter-class scheduling.
An inter-class scheduling policy (denoted by σ) represents a
sequence of scheduling decisions, which causally allocate the
intermittent and firm supply across the deadline-differentiated
demand classes. In addition to inter-class scheduling, the
supplier must also determine as to how the available supply
is allocated between customers within a given demand class.
As such, we let the intra-class scheduling policy (denoted
by φ) represent a sequence of scheduling decisions, which
dictates how the intermittent and firm supply made available to
a given demand class is allocated across customers within said
class. Finally, we let pi = (σ, φ) denote the joint inter-class
and intra-class scheduling policy employed by the supplier. In
what follows, we formally define the space of feasible inter-
class and intra-class scheduling policies.
1) Inter-Class Scheduling Policies: We characterize the
optimal inter-class scheduling policy as a solution to a con-
strained stochastic optimal control problem. First, we define
the system state at period k as the pair (zk, sk) ∈ RN+ × R+,
where the vector zk denotes the residual demand requirement
of the original aggregate demand bundle x after having been
serviced in previous periods 0, 1, · · · , k − 1. Define as the
control input the vectors uk,vk ∈ RN+ , which denote (element-
wise in j) the amount of intermittent and firm supply allocated
to demand class j at period k, respectively. Naturally then, the
state of residual demand evolves according to the discrete time
state equation:
zk+1 = zk − uk − vk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1, (8)
where the process is initialized with z0 = x. The delivery
deadline constraints manifest in a sequence of nested con-
straint sets RN+ ⊃ Z1 ⊇ Z2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ ZN = 0 converging
to the the origin, where the set Zk characterizes the feasible
state space at stage k. More precisely,
Zk = {z ∈ RN+ | zj = 0, ∀ j ≤ k}.
In other words, the feasible state space is such that each
demand class is fully serviced by its corresponding deadline.
We define as the feasible input space at stage k the set of all
inputs belonging to the set
Uk(z, s) = {(u,v) | 1>u ≤ s and z− u− v ∈ Zk+1},
which ensures one-step state feasibility and that the total
allocation of renewable supply does not exceed availability at
the current stage. In characterizing the feasible set of causal
scheduling policies, we restrict our attention to those policies
with Markovian information structure, as opposed to allowing
the control to depend on the entire history. This is without
loss of optimality, since Markovian policies are capable of
performing as well as the optimal oracle policy. We describe
the scheduling decision at each stage k by the functions
uk = µk(z, s) and vk = νk(z, s),
where µk : Zk×S → RN+ and νk : Zk×S → RN+ . A feasible
inter-class scheduling policy is any finite sequence of schedul-
ing decision functions σ = (µ0, . . . ,µN−1,ν0, . . . ,νN−1)
such that
(µk,νk)(z, s) ∈ Uk(z, s), ∀ (z, s) ∈ Zk × S
and time periods k = 0, . . . , N−1. We will occasionally write
the state and control process as {zσk}, {uσk}, and {vσk} to
emphasize their dependence on the inter-class policy σ, unless
otherwise clear from the context.
Given an aggregate demand bundle x, we denote by Σ(x)
the space of all feasible inter-class scheduling policies avail-
able for use by the supplier.
2) Intra-Class Scheduling Policies: Recall that an intra-
class scheduling policy φ determines the allocation of supply
to specific consumers within each deadline-differentiated de-
mand class, where the supply available to each demand class
is determined by the inter-class policy. Given an inter-class
scheduling policy σ ∈ Σ(x), we denote by Φ(σ) the space of
all feasible intra-class scheduling policies.6
It is important to note that the supplier’s expected profit de-
pends only on the inter-class scheduling policy being used, and
is invariant under the family of feasible intra-class scheduling
policies. This follows from the supplier’s cost indifference to
supply allocation between consumers within a given demand
class. Therefore, in characterizing the optimal scheduling pol-
icy for the supplier, we restrict our attention to the characteri-
zation of optimal inter-class policies. The distinction between
inter-class and intra-class scheduling is, however, important,
6As the formal definition of feasible intra-class policies is relevant only
to the derivation of technical proofs, we defer their precise specification to
Appendix A in order to maintain continuity in exposition.
7as the choice of intra-class scheduling policy φ can affect
the probability distribution of each consumer’s random supply
ωpiki,i(x,a). This can, in turn, influence consumer purchase
decisions.
B. Optimal Scheduling Policy
We define the expected profit J(x,p, σ) derived by a sup-
plier as the revenue derived from an aggregate demand bundle
x less the expected cost of servicing said demand bundle
under a feasible inter-class scheduling policy σ ∈ Σ(x). More
precisely, let
J(x,p, σ) = p>x − Q(x, σ),
where Q denotes the expected cost of firm generation incurred
servicing x under a feasible policy σ ∈ Σ. It follows that
Q(x, σ) =
N−1∑
k=0
E
{
c>vσk
}
, (9)
where c = (c0, . . . , c0). We wish to characterize inter-class
scheduling policies, which lead to a minimal expected cost of
firm supply. Accordingly, we have the following definition of
optimality.
Definition 5 (Optimal policy). The inter-class scheduling
policy σ∗ ∈ Σ(x) is defined to be optimal if
Q(x, σ∗) ≤ Q(x, σ), ∀ σ ∈ Σ(x). (10)
We denote by Q∗(x) = Q(x, σ∗) the minimum expected cost
of firm supply.
The following result provides an explicit characterization of
an optimal inter-class scheduling policy.
Theorem 1 (Earliest-Deadline-First). Given an aggregate de-
mand bundle x ∈ RN+ , the optimal scheduling policy σ∗ ∈
Σ(x) is given by:
µj,∗k (z, s) = min
{
zj , s−∑j−1i=1 µi,∗k (z, s)} ,
νj,∗k (z, s) = (z
j − µj,∗k (z, s)) · 1{k=j−1},
for j = 1, . . . , N , k = 0, . . . , N − 1, and (z, s) ∈ Zk × S .
Theorem 1 is intuitive.7 The optimal inter-class policy
σ∗ ∈ Σ(x) is such that the intermittent supply sk available at
each period k is allocated to those unsatisfied demand classes
with earliest-deadline-first (EDF), while the firm supply is
allocated to a demand class only when the EDF allocation
of intermittent supply is insufficient to ensure its deadline
satisfaction. In other words, the firm supply is used only as a
last resort. For the remainder of the paper, we refer to σ∗ as
the EDF scheduling policy.
Remark 1 (Implementation requirements). An attractive prop-
erty of the EDF scheduling policy σ∗ is that it is distribution-
free. Namely, it can be implemented by the supplier without
requiring explicit knowledge of the underlying probability
distribution of the intermittent supply process. On the other
7We omit a formal proof of Theorem 1, given its immediacy in derivation
upon examination of scheduling problem’s dynamic programming equations.
hand, a potential limitation of the proposed scheduling policy
is the centralization of information exchange it entails, as it’s
implementation requires periodic communication between the
supplier and each consumer-specific device. Specifically, at
every time period k, the supplier must transmit a control signal
to each device specifying its energy consumption level in that
period. These control signals are determined according to the
intra-class scheduling policy φ ∈ Φ(σ∗) being used by the
supplier. In return, each device must transmit a measurement
signal to the supplier summarizing its state (e.g., residual
energy requirement). Naturally, the time scale at which such
control schemes can be implemented will depend on the num-
ber of devices being coordinated and the available bandwidth
of the underlying communication network being used.
C. Marginal Cost Pricing
Given the EDF characterization of the optimal inter-class
scheduling policy in Theorem 1, we are now in a position to
characterize the supplier’s optimal supply curve under price
taking behavior. We define the residual process induced by
the EDF scheduling policy σ∗ as
ξk+1(x, s) = max{0, ξk(x, s)} + sk − xk+1, (11)
for k = 0, . . . , N − 1, where ξ0 = 0. We denote the entire
residual process by ξ = (ξ0, . . . , ξN ), omitting its dependency
on x and s when it is clear from the context. A positive
residual (ξk > 0) represents the amount of intermittent supply
leftover after having serviced demand class k by its deadline
k, according to the EDF inter-class scheduling policy σ∗.
A negative residual (ξk ≤ 0) represents the amount by
which the intermittent supply fell short – or, equivalently,
the amount of firm supply required to ensure satisfaction of
the demand class k. Using this newly defined process, we
have the following characterization of the minimum expected
cost of firm supply under EDF scheduling. First, we require a
technical assumption.
Assumption 2. The joint probability distribution of the inter-
mittent supply process s is assumed to be absolutely continu-
ous and have compact support. 
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. The minimum
expected recourse cost Q∗(x) derived under an aggregate de-
mand bundle x ∈ RN+ and EDF scheduling policy σ∗ ∈ Σ(x)
satisfies
Q∗(x) = E
{
c0
N∑
k=1
−min{0, ξk}
}
, (12)
and is convex and differentiable in x over [0,∞)N .
Lemma 1 admits a natural interpretation. Namely, the mini-
mum expected cost of firm supply is equivalent to the amount
by which the intermittent supply is expected to fall short for
each demand class under EDF scheduling. Moreover, it follows
readily that the expected profit J(x,p, σ∗) derived under EDF
scheduling is also differentiable and concave in x. As such,
any allocation x satisfying the first order condition,
∇x J(x,p, σ∗)>(x− y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ RN+ , (13)
8is profit maximizing for the supplier given a price bundle p ∈
P . Accordingly, we provide an explicit characterization of the
supplier’s marginal cost supply curve in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Marginal cost supply curve). Suppose that As-
sumption 2 holds. An allocation x is profit maximizing for a
given price bundle p if
p = ζ(x),
where the pricing scheme ζ : RN+ → P satisfies,
ζk(x)
c0
= P(ξk ≤ 0) +
N∑
t=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0)
(14)
for k = 1, . . . , N .
The marginal cost pricing scheme ζ specified in Equation
(14) maps every aggregate demand bundle in RN+ into a
menu of deadline differentiated prices in P , which reflects
the marginal cost of the supplier. Moreover, one can readily
interpret such pricing scheme as setting the price pk for energy
with deadline k equal to (up to a constant factor c0) the
probability that firm supply will be required to service the
bundle x at any subsequent time period t ≥ k − 1 under the
optimal inter-class scheduling policy σ∗. Naturally, the larger
the probability of shortfall, the larger the price. It is readily
verified that the pricing scheme p = ζ(x) yields, in general,
prices that are nonincreasing in the deadline. More precisely,
c0 ≥ p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pN
for all x ∈ RN+ . This property of price monotonicity is
consistent with our initial criterion for constructing such a
market system. Namely, the longer a customer is willing to
defer her consumption in time, the less she is required to pay
per unit of energy. And the price of deferrable energy is no
greater than the nominal flat rate for electricity, c0.
IV. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY
We now establish several important properties of the market
mechanism developed in Section III. In particular, under
an additional mild assumption on each consumer’s marginal
valuation on energy, we show in Sections IV-A and IV-B that a
mechanism consisting of earliest-deadline-first (EDF) schedul-
ing in combination with the marginal cost pricing scheme
in (14) is indeed incentive compatible, and achieves social
optimality at a competitive market equilibrium, respectively.
A. Incentive Compatibility
With market efficiency considerations in mind, it is im-
portant to understand when a consumer has incentive to
misreport her underlying deadline preference. A mechanism
(pi,κ) consisting of a feasible scheduling policy pi = (σ, φ)
and a pricing scheme κ is said to be incentive compatible (IC)
for consumers of a particular type, if it is a dominant-strategy
for consumers of this type to be truth-telling.
Definition 6 (Incentive compatibility). A mechanism (pi,κ)
is incentive compatible for every consumer i of type θi, if
V pii (θi, ϕ
∗
i ,x,κ) ≥ V pii (θi, ϕi,x,κ), ∀ ϕi, ∀ x ∈ RN+ ,
where ϕ∗i is the truth-telling strategy defined in Definition 3.
It is worth mentioning that the above definition of dominant
strategy incentive compatibility is strong. It requires that a
consumer would like to reveal her true type regardless of
the types and actions of other consumers and the probability
distribution on the intermittent supply process. Since the
optimal price schedule is non-increasing in the deadline, and
demand is guaranteed to be met before the requested deadline,
a consumer i does not have an incentive to request any
quantity of energy before her true deadline ki. However, if
the price of energy associated with later deadlines is low
enough, said consumer may have an incentive to report a
false later deadline if early delivery is likely (i.e., with high
probability) under the specified scheduling policy. Intuitively,
a consumer i will have incentive to misreport its deadline
if the reduction in total expenditure derived by requesting
energy with later deadlines exceeds the expected loss of utility
incurred by a shortfall in the amount of energy delivered by
her true deadline ki. Surprisingly, we show in Theorem 3 that
EDF scheduling in combination with marginal cost pricing
precludes this possibility.
For the remainder of the paper, we denote by (pi∗, ζ) the
market mechanism defined by EDF scheduling and marginal
cost pricing. More precisely, the scheduling policy pi∗ =
(σ∗, φ) consists of the EDF inter-class scheduling policy σ∗
and an arbitrary feasible intra-class policy φ ∈ Φ(σ∗). And, ζ
denotes the marginal cost pricing scheme in Equation (14).
Theorem 3 (Incentive compatibility). Suppose that Assump-
tions 1-2 hold. The mechanism (pi∗, ζ) is incentive compatible
for all consumers of a type that satisfies R ≥ c0.
We further establish in Corollary 1 that the mechanism
(pi∗, ζ) also maximizes social welfare at a unique market equi-
librium between the supplier and consumers, if the condition
R ≥ c0 holds for every consumer type θ ∈ Θ.
Remark 2. We note that the requirement R ≥ c0 is reasonable
for electricity consumers, as their marginal valuation on elec-
tricity consumption is commonly higher than the nominal flat
rate for electricity, which in our model is denoted by c0. On
this basis, electricity demand is generally modeled as inelastic
[34], [38], especially in the short term [40].
Remark 3. We also note that incentive compatibility may
fail to hold if certain assumptions regarding a consumer’s
utility function are violated. First, one can readily show that
incentive compatibility may fail to hold for a consumer i of
type θi = (ki, Ri, qi), if the marginal cost of firm supply
exceeds her marginal valuation of energy – namely, Ri < c0.
Second, we note that the result in Theorem 3 fails to hold for
arbitrary concave utility functions. This is intuitive. Consider a
consumer i having a highly concave utility function. Because
of the large underlying concavity in her utility, said consumer
will prefer to report a false deadline that is later than her true
9deadline ki, if she can obtain a fraction of her demand before
stage ki with high probability and at a low price.
B. Market Equilibrium and Efficiency
In this section, we show that mechanism consisting of
marginal cost pricing together with EDF scheduling, results
in an efficient market equilibrium at which social welfare (the
sum of aggregate consumer surplus and supplier profit) is
maximized. First, we make an assumption under which we
will operate for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 3. We assume that every consumer type
(k,R, q) ∈ Θ satisfies R ≥ c0. 
See Remark 2 for a discussion on Assumption 3. It follows
from Assumption 3 and Theorem 3 that under the mechanism
(pi∗, ζ), it is a dominant strategy for every consumer to
be truth-telling. The aggregate demand resulting from the
true-telling population, which we denote by x∗, is given by
Equation (3). Theorem 2 shows that it is profit-maximizing
for a supplier to meet the aggregate demand x∗ at the price
bundle p = ζ(x∗). In what follows, we will show that the
resulting quantity-price pair (x∗, ζ(x∗)) constitutes a market
equilibrium that is social welfare maximizing. We first offer a
definition of market equilibrium.
Definition 7 (Market equilibrium). Let (pi,κ) be a market
mechanism consisting of a scheduling policy pi and pricing
scheme κ. Given the types of all consumers θ, a quantity-
price pair (x,p) is a market equilibrium under the mechanism
(pi,κ) if the following two conditions hold.
(i) It is a dominant strategy for every consumer to be truth-
telling under the mechanism (pi,κ), and the resulting
aggregate demand bundle is x.
(ii) The aggregate demand bundle x together with the
scheduling policy pi maximize a price-taking supplier’s
expected profit at price bundle p = κ(x).
In Definition 7, the first condition ensures that under the
mechanism (pi,κ), the aggregate demand (resulting from a
truth-telling non-atomic population) is x. The second condition
requires that given the price bundle p = κ(x) (which is
determined according to the pricing scheme κ and aggregate
demand x), a price-taking supplier would like to employ the
scheduling policy pi and supply the bundle x. We therefore
have supply equal to demand. We show in the following corol-
lary that the EDF scheduling policy pi∗ = (σ∗, φ) together
with the marginal cost pricing scheme ζ constitute a market
mechanism that induces a unique market equilibrium, which
maximizes the social welfare.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Given the
types of all consumers θ and a market mechanism (pi∗, ζ),
there exists a unique market equilibrium (x∗, ζ(x∗)) that
maximizes the social welfare. Here, x∗ is the truth-telling
aggregate demand bundle specified in Equation (3).
V. CONCLUSION
To explore the flexibility of deferrable electricity loads,
we propose a novel market for deadline-differentiated energy
services that offers discounted (per-unit) electricity prices to
consumers in exchange for their consent to defer their electric
power consumption, and provides a guarantee on the aggregate
quantity of energy to be delivered by a consumer-specified
deadline. We provide a full characterization of the joint
scheduling and pricing scheme that yields an efficient (compet-
itive) market equilibrium between a (price-taking) supplier and
a large consumer population. Somewhat surprisingly, we show
that this efficient mechanism is incentive compatible in that
every consumer would like to reveal her true deadline to the
supplier, regardless of the actions taken by other consumers.
There are several interesting directions for future research.
First, it would be of practical interest to relax the assumption
requiring a fixed price of firm supply to allow for time-varying
prices. Second, the market we have considered in our analysis
is single shot, in the sense that it is cleared only once. As a
natural extension, it would be of interest to analyze a dynamic
analog of our formulation in which the market is cleared
on a dynamic basis over a finite or infinite horizon. Such a
generalization of our model would also serve to facilitate the
treatment of random consumer arrival times.
APPENDIX A
INTRA-CLASS SCHEDULING POLICIES
Formally, for a consumer i who purchases a bundle a =
(a1, . . . , aN ), we let λk,i(x,a) ∈ RN+ denote (element-wise in
j) the amount of energy delivered (at period k) to consumer
i so as to satisfy her demand aj . We denote the intra-class
scheduling policy by
φ = {(λ0,i, . . . ,λN−1,i) | i ∈ [0, 1]} ,
where λk,i : RN+ × A → RN+ for all i ∈ [0, 1] and k =
0, . . . , N − 1. Given an inter-class scheduling policy σ ∈ Σ,
an intra-class scheduling policy φ is feasible if and only if it
satisfies the following constraints.
1. The intra-class scheduling policy should not deliver any
supply that is allocated to class j to consumers outside
this class. That is, for each demand class j = 1, . . . , N ,
we have that λjk,i(x,a) = 0 for every consumer i such
that aj = 0.
2. At every period k, no energy is delivered to demand
class j with j ≤ k by the feasibility of the inter-class
policy σ ∈ Σ. That is, λjk,i(x,a) = 0 for every i ∈ [0, 1],
and every 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ N − 1.
3. The total supply allocated to demand class j at time
period k must be fully utilized, i.e.∫
[0,1]
λjk,i(x,a) η(di) = µ
j
k+ν
j
k, ∀ 0 ≤ k < j ≤ N−1,
where we use the Lebesgue integral (with respect to
Lebesgue measure η defined on [0, 1]), and µjk and
νjk denote the amount of intermittent and firm supply
allocated to demand class j at period k, according to
the inter-class policy σ.
10
4. Each consumer’s individual delivery commitments must
be met:∑k
t=1
at ≤ ωpik,i(x,a) ≤
∑N
t=1
at, k = 1, . . . , N,
where the total energy delivered to consumer i by it’s
true deadline ki is given by
ωpiki,i(x,a) =
ki−1∑
t=0
N∑
j=1
λjt,i(x,a). (15)
Notice that for any feasible inter-class scheduling policy
σ ∈ Σ, it is always possible to ensure the satisfaction of
the above constraint.
We denote the feasible intra-class policy space by Φ(σ), which
is parameterized by a given inter-class policy σ ∈ Σ.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first establish the simplified form of Q∗ in Eq. (12).
For notational simplicity, we denote the sequence of optimal
inputs by u∗k = µ
∗
k(zk, sk) and v
∗
k = ν
∗
k(zk, sk) for k =
0, . . . , N−1. Under the optimal scheduling policy, firm supply
is deployed only as a last resort to ensure task satisfaction. It
follows that
Q∗(x) = c0 ·
N∑
k=1
E
{
vk,∗k−1
}
.
To establish the desired result, it suffices to show that vk,∗k−1 =
−min{0, ξk}. First, define the quantity
δk =
k−1∑
j=0
sj −
k∑
`=1
`−1∑
j=0
u`,∗j , ∀ k = 1, . . . , N,
which denotes the maximum amount of intermittent supply
available to demand class k + 1 across the first k time
periods under a sequence of EDF allocations u∗0, . . . ,u
∗
k−1.
Clearly, we have that δk ≥ 0 for all k, given feasibility
of the allocations u∗0, . . . ,u
∗
k−1 under the intermittent supply
availability constraints. One can readily show via an inductive
argument that
ξk = δk − vk,∗k−1, ∀ k = 1, . . . , N.
Using this characterization of the residual process ξ, we have
that
δk > 0 =⇒ vk,∗k−1 = 0 =⇒ min{0, ξk} = 0,
δk = 0 =⇒ vk,∗k−1 ≥ 0 =⇒ min{0, ξk} = −vk,∗k−1,
which yields the desired result that min{0, ξk} = − vk,∗k−1
and establishes the form of Q∗ in Eq. (12).
We now establish convexity of the expected recourse cost
Q∗(x) directly. Let x1,x2 ∈ R+ and denote the corresponding
optimal scheduling policies by σ∗1 ∈ Σ(x1) and σ∗2 ∈ Σ(x2).
Define the convex combination of demand bundles xλ =
λx1 + (1− λ)x2, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that
λQ∗(x1) + (1− λ)Q∗(x2) = E
N−1∑
k=0
c>(λvσ
∗
1
k + (1− λ)vσ
∗
2
k ).
And, it is not difficult to show that the convex combination of
the constituent policies λσ∗1 + (1− λ)σ∗2 is admissible for the
convex combination of demand bundles, i.e., λσ∗1+(1−λ)σ∗2 ∈
Σ(xλ). Convexity of Q∗ follows. Differentiability of Q∗(x)
over (0,∞)N follows immediately from the proof of Theorem
2, in which we show that
∂Q∗(x)
∂xk
= ζk(x), k = 1, . . . , N,
where the function ζk(x), defined in (14), is bounded and
continuous over (0,∞)N for each k = 1, . . . , N . 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To simplify exposition, we employ the shorthand notation
(·)− = min{0, ·}. Fix a price bundle p ∈ RN+ . We have
previously shown in Theorem 1 that the EDF inter-class
scheduling policy σ∗ ∈ Σ(x) is optimal for any demand
bundle x ∈ RN+ . Hence, it suffices to show that p = ζ(x)
satisfies the first order condition for optimality (13). Taking
the gradient of the supplier’s expected profit with respect to
x yields ∇x J(x,p, σ∗) = p − ∇x Q∗(x). It remains to
show that
∂Q∗(x)
∂xk
= ζk(x)
for k = 1, . . . , N. Working the with the simplified form of Q∗
established in Lemma 1, it follows readily that
∂Q∗(x)
∂xk
= c0 ·
N∑
`=k
∂
∂xk
E
{
ξ`(x, s)
−} , (16)
where we’ve truncated the summation from below at ` = k,
as ξ`(x, s) is wholly independent of xk for all ` < k. We
therefore restrict our attention to ` ≥ k for the remainder
of the proof. The next step of the proof relies on the ability
to interchange the order of differentiation and expectation in
(16). It is obvious from construction that ξ`(x, s)− is both a
continuous function of (x, s) and piecewise affine in xk (with
a finite number of linear segments) for each s. It follows that
ξ`(x, s)
− is differentiable almost everywhere in xk ∈ R+ and
satisfies ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xk ξ`(x, s)−
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1
almost everywhere. Then, for each xk ∈ R+, we have that
∂ξ`(x, s)
−/∂xk is integrable in xk and by the dominated
convergence theorem
∂
∂xk
E
{
ξ`(x, s)
−} = E{ ∂
∂xk
ξ`(x, s)
−
}
.
Finally, it is not difficult to see that
∂
∂xk
ξ`(x, s)
− =

1{ξk≤0}, ` = k,
1{ξ`≤0} ·
`−1∏
t=k
1{ξt>0}, ` > k.
And taking expectation, we have the desired result. 
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let x be the aggregate demand of the other consumers (ex-
cluding i). Suppose that the supplier uses the EDF (inter-class
scheduling) policy σ∗, and an arbitrary intra-class scheduling
policy φ ∈ Φ(σ∗). We let pi∗ = (σ∗, φ). We consider a
consumer i of some type θi = (k,R, q) such that c0 ≤ R. We
will show that the consumer, who faces an arbitrary aggregate
demand bundleh, x, requested by other consumers, would like
to take the truth-telling action specified in Definition 3. For
the rest of this proof, we will use p = {pk}Nk=1 to denote the
price bundle induced by the pricing scheme ζ (cf. its definition
in Eq. (14)), at the aggregate demand x.
If consumer i is truth-telling, she will request a quantity q
before deadline k, and receive an expected payoff of
V pi
∗
i (θi, ϕ
∗
i ,x, ζ)
= U(q)− qpk
= qR− qc0
[
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
∑N
t=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0)
]
.
(17)
Since the optimal price schedule is nonincreasing in dead-
line, and demand is guaranteed to be met before the requested
deadline, the consumer has no incentive to request a positive
amount of electricity at some period t that is earlier than
k. We can therefore assume that consumer i takes an action
a′ = ϕ′i(θi) such that
a′t = 0, t = 0, . . . , k − 1.
Since the consumer cannot increase its expected payoff
(compared to being truth-telling) by reporting a′k ≥ q, we
focus on the case where a′k < q. We first write the consumer’s
expected payoff (achieved by the action a′) as
V pi
∗
i (θi, ϕ
′
i,x, ζ) = E
{
Uθ
(
ωpi
∗
k,i(x,a
′)
)}
−
N∑
t=k
pta
′
t.
Showing that V pi
∗
i (θi, ϕ
′
i,x, ζ) is no more than the expected
payoff in (17) is equivalent to
Rq − (q − a′k)c0
[
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
∑N
t=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0)
]
≥ E
{
Uθ
(
ωpi
∗
k,i(x,a
′)
)}
−
∑N
t=k+1
pta
′
t.
(18)
We will derive an upper bound on the right hand side of (18),
and show that this upper bound cannot exceed the left hand
side of (18). For notational convenience, we define
ηt = {ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0}
for all t = k + 1, . . . , N − 1 and
ηk = {ξk ≤ 0}, ηN = {ξk > 0, . . . , ξN−1 > 0}.
Note that these N − k + 1 events are mutually disjoint.
Further, it is straightforward to see that ξk ≤ 0 implies that
ωpik,i(x,a
′) = a′k. While, on the other hand, ξk > 0 implies that
one of the (mutually disjoint) events {ηt}Nt=k+1 must occur,
i.e.,
1 = P
(⋃N
t=k
ηt
)
=
N∑
t=k
P(ηt). (19)
Under the event ηt, the amount of energy delivered by the
EDF scheduling policy before her true deadline k, ωpi
∗
k,i(x,a
′),
cannot exceed
∑t
τ=k a
′
τ , for t = k, . . . , N . It follows from
Assumption 1 that
Rq − Uθ (x) ≥ R (q − x)+ , ∀ x ≥ 0,
where (·)+ = max{·, 0}. We then have
Rq − E
{
Uθ
(
ωpi
∗
k,i(x,a
′)
)}
≥ R
∑N
t=k
P(ηt) ·
(
q −
∑t
τ=k
a′τ
)+
.
(20)
We now argue that the right hand side of (20) is minimized
at some vector a˜ such that
∑N
t=k a˜t ≤ q. To see this,
suppose that
∑N
t=k a
′
t > q. Let T be the smallest t such that∑t
m=k a
′
m > q. We define an alternative vector a˜
a˜t = a
′
t, t ≤ T − 1, a˜T = q −
T−1∑
m=k
a′m, (21)
and a˜t = 0, for every t > T . We have
∑N
t=k a˜t = q, and∑N
t=k
P(ηt) ·
(
q −
∑t
τ=k
a′τ
)+
=
∑N
t=k
P(ηt) ·
(
q −
∑t
τ=k
a˜τ
)+
.
Note that if
∑N
t=k a
′
t ≤ q, then a˜ = a′. To validate (18), it
suffices to show that for any vector a˜ defined in (21),
R
∑N
t=k
P(ηt) ·
(
q −
∑t
τ=k
a˜τ
)
≥ −
∑N
t=k+1
pta˜t + (q − a˜k)c0
[
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
∑N
t=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0)
]
,
(22)
where the left hand side is a lower bound on the loss of ex-
pected utility due to the non-truthful action a˜ (cf. the inequality
in (20)), and the right hand side is the difference between the
payment under the truth-telling action and the action a˜. We
will prove the following inequality that is equivalent to (22)
R
∑N
t=k
P(ηt) ·
(
q −
∑t
τ=k
a˜τ
)
= R(q − a˜k)−R
∑N
t=k+1
(
P(ηt) ·
∑t
τ=k+1
a˜τ
)
= R(q − a˜k)−R
∑N
t=k+1
(
a˜t ·
∑N
τ=m
P(ηm)
)
≥ (q − a˜k)c0
[
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
N∑
t=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξt−1 > 0, ξt ≤ 0)
]
−
∑N
t=k+1
pta˜t,
(23)
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where the first equality follows from (19), and the second
equality is obtained by rearranging terms.
It follows from the characterization of supplier marginal
cost in (14) that for t = k + 1, . . . , N,
a˜tpt = a˜tc0
N∑
m=t
P(ξt > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0)
≥ a˜tc0
N∑
m=t
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0).
(24)
We then have, for t = k + 1, . . . , N ,
Ra˜t
∑N
m=t
P(ηm)− a˜tpt
= Ra˜t
(
1− P(ξk ≤ 0)−
∑t−1
m=k+1
P(ηm)
)
− a˜tpt
≤ Ra˜t
(
1− P(ξk ≤ 0)−
∑t−1
m=k+1
P(ηm)
)
−a˜tc0
∑N
m=t
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0)
≤ Ra˜t (1− P(ξk ≤ 0))
−a˜tc0
∑N
m=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0)
≤ Ra˜t − a˜tc0
(
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
∑N
m=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0)
)
.
(25)
Here, the first inequality follows from (24); the second inequal-
ity is true, because R ≥ c0 and ηm = {ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 >
0, ξm ≤ 0}, for m = k + 1, . . . , t − 1; the last inequality
follows from R ≥ c0. For any vector a˜ with
∑N
t=k a˜t ≤ q,
from (25) we have∑N
t=k+1
(
−pta˜t +Ra˜t
∑N
m=t
P(ηm)
)
≤
∑N
t=k+1
a˜t
[
R− c0
(
P(ξk ≤ 0)
+
∑N
m=k+1
P(ξk > 0, . . . , ξm−1 > 0, ξm ≤ 0)
)]
.
(26)
Since R ≥ c0, the right hand side of (26) is nondecreasing
in
∑N
t=k+1 a˜t. The desired result in (23) follows from the
fact
∑N
t=k+1 a˜t ≤ q − a˜k. Since the preceding analysis
holds for any action a′ and any aggregate demand bundle
x, we conclude that it is a dominant strategy for consumer
i to be truth-telling, i.e., the pricing scheme (14) is incentive
compatible, in the sense of Definition 6. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We first show that (x∗, ζ(x∗)) is a market equilibrium (in
the sense of Definition 7), and then argue that it is the unique
market equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare. Under
the mechanism (σ∗, φ, ζ), it follows from Assumption 3 and
Theorem 3 that it is a dominant strategy for every consumer
to be truth-telling, and therefore the aggregate demand is x∗.
Given the price bundle ζ(x∗), the aggregate demand bundle
x∗ together with the EDF scheduling policy maximizes the
supplier’s expected profit (cf. Theorem 2). Hence, the pair,
(x∗, ζ(x∗)), constitutes a market equilibrium.
Let (x,p) be a market equilibrium. The second condition
of Definition 7 requires that the given the price bundle p, the
quantity x maximizes the (price-taking) supplier’s expected
profit. We note that this implies that p is the supplier’s
marginal cost to supply x. Since the supplier marginal cost
never exceeds c0, at any price bundle that represents supplier
marginal cost, a truth-telling consumer would request her max-
imum demand by her true deadline, and therefore the aggregate
demand of a truth-telling consumer population is always x∗.
The uniqueness of the truth-telling aggregate demand implies
the uniqueness of a market equilibrium.
It is straightforward to see that social welfare is maximized
at this market equilibrium, because under Assumption 3, it is
socially optimal to fully serve the aggregate demand x∗, and
further, the EDF scheduling policy σ∗ minimizes the expected
cost of servicing x∗. 
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